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ORGANIZING FOR INBOUND OPEN INNOVATION: 
HOW EXTERNAL CONSULTANTS AND A DEDICATED R&D UNIT 
INFLUENCE PRODUCT INNOVATION PERFORMANCE 
 
 
Abstract 
Firms increasingly acquire technological knowledge from external sources to improve 
their innovation performance. This strategic approach is known as inbound open innovation. 
The existing empirical evidence regarding the impact of inbound open innovation on 
performance, however, is ambiguous. The equivocal results are due to moderating factors that 
influence a firm’s ability to acquire technological knowledge from external sources and to 
transform it into innovation outputs. This article focuses on a relevant yet overlooked category 
of moderating factors: organization of R&D. It explores two organizational mechanisms, one 
informal and external-oriented (involvement of external consultants in R&D activities), and 
one formalized and internal-oriented (existence of a dedicated R&D unit), in the acquisition 
of technological knowledge through R&D outsourcing, a particular contractual form for 
inbound open innovation.  
Drawing on a capabilities perspective and using a longitudinal dataset of 841 Spanish 
manufacturing firms observed over the period 1999-2007, this article provides a fine-grained 
analysis of the moderation effects of the two organizational mechanisms. The involvement of 
external consultants in R&D activities strengthens the impact of inbound open innovation on 
innovation performance, by increasing marginal benefits of acquiring external technological 
knowledge through R&D outsourcing. Moreover, it reduces the level of inbound open 
innovation to which the highest innovation performance corresponds. Instead, the existence 
of a dedicated R&D unit makes the firm less sensitive to changes in the level of inbound open 
innovation, by reducing marginal benefits of acquiring external technological knowledge 
through R&D outsourcing, and increases the level of inbound open innovation to which the 
highest innovation performance corresponds. 
The results regarding the role of informal and formalized R&D organizational 
mechanisms contribute to research on open innovation and absorptive capacity, and also 
inform managers as to what organizational mechanism is recommended to acquire external 
technological knowledge, depending on the objectives that the firm pursues. 
 
Practitioner Points: 
 The study provides guidance on how to improve the benefits of inbound open 
innovation using two different mechanisms: external R&D consultants or a dedicated 
R&D unit. 
 Using external consultants allows firms to achieve larger innovation outputs, even 
with only small increases of R&D outsourcing, and is therefore beneficial for firms 
that want to increase innovation performance by increasing inbound open innovation. 
 Establishing a dedicated R&D unit allows firms to achieve higher levels of R&D 
outsourcing before negative consequences occur, and is therefore beneficial for firms 
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with significant R&D outsourcing that wish to better manage an extensive flow of 
external technological knowledge. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article examines whether and how the organization of Research and Development 
(R&D) influences the relationship between the acquisition of technological knowledge from 
external sources and innovation performance. The practice of acquiring technological 
knowledge from external sources, in addition to generating it internally, is known as inbound 
open innovation (IOI) (Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006; Spithhoven et al., 2010). The 
growing importance of IOI is evident both in theory and in practice. Recent statistics show 
that over one third of innovative firms cooperate with external partners to access their 
technological knowledge (Eurostat, 2011). The ongoing division of labor in technological 
innovation, the diffusion of innovation intermediaries, and the strengthening of intellectual 
property regimes will likely support this trend in the future. Academics have also recognized 
the importance of IOI, as evidenced by the appearance of special issues of academic journals 
devoted to the subject, including R&D Management (Gassmann et al., 2010) and Research 
Policy (West et al., 2014), as well as recent review articles (West and Bogers, 2013). 
The extant empirical evidence of the effects of IOI is equivocal. Scholarly works find 
positive (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Ettlie and Pavlou, 2006), negative (Kessler et al., 
2000; Jones et al., 2000), and not significant (Zahra, 1996) influences of externally acquired 
technological knowledge on innovation performance. The ambiguous results may derive from 
the coexistence of benefits from IOI, e.g., access to know-how from distant fields, higher 
flexibility, reduced time to market, risk and cost sharing, as well as of drawbacks, e.g., lower 
knowledge appropriability, loss of control over core competencies and high transaction costs 
(Kessler et al., 2000; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). The inverted U-shaped relationship 
found in more recent studies (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Laursen and Salter, 2006) suggests 
that the positive contribution of IOI on performance has diminishing returns and, after a 
certain level of investment in external technological knowledge, becomes negative. 
The equivocal findings in the literature suggest the need to identify contingencies that 
shape the IOI-performance relationship (Katz and Allen, 1982; Rothaermel and Alexandre, 
2009; Chatterji, 1996). Clearly, there are moderating factors that influence the ability of a firm 
to acquire, assimilate and transform technological knowledge developed elsewhere into 
innovative outputs, i.e., its absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and 
George, 2002). Prior examinations of such factors mainly focused on internal R&D 
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investments (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Jones et al., 2000; Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2006), the diversity of partners from which knowledge is sourced (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; 
Katila and Ahuja, 2002), the experience with IOI (Anand and Khanna, 2000), and the 
socialization tactics used to disseminate and integrate knowledge (Lewin et al., 2011). 
Interestingly, evidence is ambiguous also on the moderating effect of these firm-level factors 
(Laursen and Salter, 2006; Chen et al., 2009; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010). 
Following recent calls for further research on the IOI–performance relationship and on 
the factors that influence the firm’s ability of managing inbound open innovation (e.g., West 
and Bogers, 2013; Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler, 2009), this article focuses on an important 
domain which has not been adequately discussed in existing research, namely, the 
organization of R&D. The importance of a proper organization of R&D activities has been 
long recognized, although conceptualized primarily in a closed innovation setting (Chiesa, 
2001). This stream of research has focused on intra-organizational factors, such as formalized 
and informal organizational structures (Teece, 1996), human resource management practices 
(Laursen and Foss, 2003), control and communication mechanisms (Nobel and Birkinshaw, 
1998). As firms increasingly adopt IOI, it is critical that they design an organization for R&D 
that adequately supports the interaction with the external context (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 
2005; Arora et al., 2014). Prior open innovation research has shown that the direction and 
efficacy of knowledge transfer processes significantly depend on the organizational 
mechanisms adopted by firms to configure information processing structures and social 
networks (Colombo et al., 2011). Hansen and Nohria (2004) and Chiaroni et al. (2011) 
highlight the importance of intervening at the organizational level to ensure successful 
acquisition and exploitation of externally acquired technological knowledge. However, 
empirical tests of the influence of organizational factors on the IOI-performance relationship 
are lacking. 
This article argues that two mechanisms for R&D organization, the involvement of 
external consultants in R&D activities and the existence of a dedicated R&D unit, influence 
a firm’s ability to turn external technological knowledge into product innovation. Consultants 
include external actors such as experts, technology brokers, innovation agencies, technical 
and scientific service providers, which support firms in their R&D activities on an ad hoc, 
temporary basis and without being formally recognized within their organizational structure 
(Bessant and Rush, 1995; Tether and Tajar, 2008). The existence of a dedicated R&D unit, 
through the allocation of full-time employees and resources to R&D activities, represents 
instead a formalized mechanism with lasting impacts on a firm’s organization (Chiesa, 2001). 
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This study focuses on these two organizational mechanisms because research on the critical 
success factors in R&D and new product development (Ernst, 2002; Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1995) suggests that formalizing R&D activities and creating social and personal ties to 
establish rich communication networks represent two key antecedents to superior product 
innovation. The impact of these factors on innovation performance has, however, been 
analyzed in a closed innovation paradigm, according to which firms generate and exploit 
technological knowledge primarily within their boundaries. To date, there is no empirical 
evidence of whether and how these two organizational mechanisms may benefit firms that 
practice IOI. By considering informal and external-oriented (consultants) and formalized and 
internal-oriented (dedicated R&D unit) organizational mechanisms, this study offers a 
multifaceted (though naturally incomplete) view of R&D organization. 
Moreover, this article focuses on R&D outsourcing as a contractual form for the 
acquisition of external technological knowledge. Although very common in practice (Howells 
et al., 2008), R&D outsourcing, defined as “buying R&D services from other organizations, 
such as universities, public research organizations, commercial engineers or suppliers” (van 
de Vrande et al., 2009, pp. 428), has received limited attention in innovation research, 
compared to other forms of IOI, e.g., mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures and in-licensing 
(Chiesa and Manzini, 1998; Kotlar et al., 2013). Differently from equity-based IOI 
transactions, which are characterized by low reversibility, long time horizon and a strong 
control over the acquisition process, R&D outsourcing is a more reversible non-equity form 
that typically entails lower control and commitment by the parties involved.  The study by 
Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) explicitly examines factors that influence the relationship between 
technological knowledge acquired through R&D outsourcing and innovation performance. 
Note, however, that the factors considered in Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) (the intensity of 
internal R&D and the breadth of formal R&D collaborations) differ from those included in 
this article. 
The conceptual framework developed in this study is empirically tested using a dataset 
including 841 Spanish firms from 20 manufacturing industries over the period 1999-2007. 
The findings extend the theoretical understanding of IOI bringing new evidence to the lively 
but controversial debate on this phenomenon. In particular, adopting a capability-based view 
of IOI, this article develops and tests theoretical arguments about the role of R&D 
organizational mechanisms in building the capabilities of managing IOI. In an open 
innovation context, the transfer of technological knowledge and complex relationships with 
R&D contractors expose managers to additional challenges as compared to those working in 
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closed systems. This article also complements extant research on IOI focusing on a 
contractual form, R&D outsourcing, which so far has been under-researched. Finally, this 
study provides interesting implications for managers searching for organizational 
mechanisms to help their firms benefit from technological knowledge acquired from external 
sources.  
The article is structured as follows. The next section develops theory and hypotheses. The 
third and fourth sections describe the sample, the variables and the model used for the 
empirical analysis, whereas the fifth section presents the findings of the study. Finally, results 
are discussed and conclusions are outlined. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Technological innovation can be conceptualized as a process that transforms a set of 
inputs (technological and market knowledge) into outputs (new products). Consistent with the 
growing diffusion of the open innovation paradigm, one increasingly important input to this 
process is external technological knowledge, which can be acquired from contractors through 
R&D outsourcing agreements. Based on prior research, it is proposed that the relationship 
between this particular input and product innovation performance has an inverted U-shape. 
Several studies have documented a positive contribution of external technological knowledge 
to the quality (Haour, 1992; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000), flexibility (Tapon and Thong, 1999; 
Kessler et al., 2000), speed (Leone and Reichstein, 2012) and cost of the technological 
innovation process (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). As the reliance on IOI increases, however, it 
shows diminishing returns on performance, because it enhances the likelihood that the firm 
acquires technological knowledge that produces lower yields (Deeds and Hill, 1996). Past a 
tipping point, any investment in IOI has negative performance effects. Over-acquiring 
external technological knowledge results into the loss of control over critical technological 
competences, a very dispersed knowledge base and the proliferation of ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs (Wang et al., 2009; Becker and Zirpoli, 2003). 
This study adopts a capability-based view of open innovation processes (Lichtenthaler 
and Lichtenthaler, 2009). According to this perspective, the productivity of the transformation 
of external technology knowledge into innovation outputs depends on a set of capabilities that 
allow firms to identify and screen external sources of technological knowledge, analyze and 
interpret this knowledge, adapt and integrate it with existing internal knowledge, and 
incorporate the resulting combination into new products. Influential articles in innovation 
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research discuss these capabilities for managing IOI in relation to the concept of absorptive 
capacity (Zahra and George, 20 Lewin et al., 2011). 
The next section argues that two R&D organizational mechanisms, the involvement of 
external consultants in R&D activities and the existence of a dedicated R&D unit, influence 
the development of these capabilities and thus moderate the relationship between external 
technological knowledge acquired through R&D outsourcing and product innovation 
performance. 
 
The moderating role of external consultants 
The moderation exerted by the involvement of external consultants in R&D activities on 
the IOI-performance relationship is posited to be positive because this organizational 
mechanism allows the focal firm to develop a set of capabilities that are needed to 
productively acquire technological knowledge from R&D contractors and to transform it into 
new products (Bessant and Rush, 1995). 
As the innovation process opens up, the interorganizational transfer of technology 
becomes a key task. This task is inherently social (Podolny and Stuart, 1995), as most open 
innovation deals are initiated through personal contacts and are established within socially 
embedded networks of direct and secondary relationships (Bidault and Fischer 1994). The 
importance of relationships stems from the imperfect nature of markets for technology 
(Bianchi et al., 2014). External consultants are primary sources of relationships and they build 
and maintain thick and extended social networks as they fill structural holes (Allen, 1977; 
Burt, 1992). According to Gans and Stern (2003), the brokering role played by external 
consultants can increase the operational effectiveness of markets for technology, as they are 
able to reach a wider and more sophisticated population of potential partners. These 
professionals leverage their contacts, often colleagues working in the same field in other 
organizations, to keep themselves abreast of technological developments, to be more exposed 
to emerging opportunities and to technology suppliers, to identify value-adding knowledge to 
be absorbed (Allen, 1977). Richer networks and personal relationships result in more 
proficient acquisition of technological knowledge. As a result, the involvement of external 
consultants allows the focal firm to develop a first critical capability for IOI, namely, the 
capability to scout and identify potentially valuable providers of R&D outsourcing services. 
Personal relationships and the social embeddedness in the markets for technology granted 
by external consultants are especially relevant when the good to be transferred, technological 
knowledge, is difficult to appropriate, has ill-defined property rights and whose quality is hard 
11 
 
to assess in advance. In a context of weak appropriability, trust and credibility of external 
consultants, who have repeated interactions in the markets for technology, facilitate the 
closing of R&D outsourcing agreements by mitigating information asymmetries and 
transactional uncertainty (Arrow, 1996). This invites firms to open up and increase the 
likelihood that a mutually convenient agreement is reached between the contractor and the 
focal firm. External consultants also facilitate negotiations by balancing the power of the 
counterparts (Bessant and Rush, 1995; Robinson and Stuart, 2007). Personal relationships and 
the resulting trust thus permit the spotting of better IOI opportunities, and also facilitate 
seizing these opportunities by allowing high potential external technological knowledge into 
the innovation process. Consequently, the involvement of external consultants allows the 
focal firm to develop other critical capabilities for IOI, such as creating a trustworthy 
relationship with the external contractor and effectively negotiating the terms of the R&D 
outsourcing agreement. 
Relationships with external consultants are also critical in the assimilation of externally 
acquired technological knowledge. Many R&D collaborations fail due to problems emerging 
during the implementation and management of the deal. In particular, shirking and other 
opportunistic behaviors typically arise when the technological knowledge is transferred from 
the contractor to the focal firm. The personal ties, reputation and informal approach provided 
by external consultants mitigate these problems and ensure that the transferred knowledge is 
not limited to the codified and contractually agreed parts but also includes the tacit knowledge 
that resides in invidual minds. Bell and Zaheer (2007) show that social relationships between 
staff from different organizations are superior conduits for knowledge flow between 
geographically separate and culturally different entities.  Therefore, the involvement of 
external consultants allows the focal firm to develop the capability to amplify the transfer 
during the collaboration with the R&D contractor, including both tacit and codified aspects.  
In the light of the influence that the involvement of external consultants in R&D activities 
has on critical capabilities for managing IOI (summarized in the upper part of Table 1), the 
following hypothesis is presented: 
 
H1: The relationship between external technological knowledge acquired through 
R&D outsourcing and product innovation performance is positively moderated by 
the involvement of external consultants. 
 
[Table 1] 
12 
 
 
The moderating role of a dedicated R&D unit 
The existence of a dedicated R&D unit is posited to positively moderate the IOI-
performance relationship. This effect derives from the influence played by this organizational 
mechanism on certain capabilities needed to productively acquire technological knowledge 
from R&D contractors and to transform it into new products, which are discussed below. 
Establishing a dedicated R&D unit is a formalized decision that deeply impacts a firm’s 
existent structures and routines. The higher openness of innovation processes calls the R&D 
function to assume a new role. Rather than being the repository of a firm’s core technological 
competencies where internal innovation opportunities are generated and pursued, the R&D 
unit takes on critical brokering functions to effectively leverage external sources of 
technology (Chiesa and Frattini, 2008). Playing a brokering role implies that the professionals 
in the R&D unit have to perform or at least coordinate previously distant tasks, such as due 
diligence, partner screening, negotiation and relationship management. The continuity of 
action resulting from assigning employees to a dedicated unit fosters learning effects based 
on prior experience. The unit thus becomes a collector for the know-how on IOI available in 
the company (Zollo and Winter, 2002). In an examination of innovation alliances, Kale et al. 
(2002) show that establishing a dedicated function to capture, integrate, and disseminate 
experience-based alliance know-how is a significant driver of success, above and beyond the 
positive effect of experience. Therefore, it can be argued that the existence of a dedicated 
R&D unit enhances the firm’s capability to leverage learning effects about how external 
technological knowledge should be acquired and transformed into new products. 
Stronger IOI capabilities rest not only upon experiential learning, but also on the creation 
of routines that articulate and codify the procedural knowledge gained from prior experience 
with R&D outsourcing. The development of these routines, which are at the basis of deliberate 
learning, and their diffusion within the organization are favored by the establishment of a 
dedicated R&D unit (Kale and Singh, 2007), which contributes to a more formalized 
management of IOI management. Routines help reduce the amount of managerial attention 
needed to perform R&D outsourcing, and can make more efficient use of the available 
attention (Ocasio, 1997). Consequently, firms can rely more on R&D outsourcing without 
suffering from its negative effects. Therefore, the existence of a dedicated R&D unit allows 
the focal firm to develop a critical capability for IOI, namely the capability to establish 
formalized routines for the acquisition of external technological knowledge. 
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A dedicated unit that pools R&D resources allows the firm to develop a thorough 
understanding of its technological needs and of the future desired trajectories. This helps 
making correct decisions about the R&D tasks to be outsourced and the external contributor 
with which to collaborate. Better assessment of the current knowledge endowment of the firm 
and of its knowledge gaps, and the constant monitoring of their evolution, reduce the risks 
that critical technical competencies weaken as the reliance over external technology increases. 
Therefore, the existence of a dedicated R&D unit contributes to the development of the 
capability to understand and anticipate the technological needs of the focal firm. 
Once the external technological knowledge is absorbed, the dedicated R&D unit serves 
as an internal hub for synthesizing, reconfiguring and aligning the knowledge pertaining to 
different technical domains and originating from external and internal sources (Faraj and 
Sproull, 2000; Kale and Singh, 2007). By leveraging complementarities between 
heterogeneous knowledge bases and generating novel combinations, a dedicated R&D unit 
improves the firm’s capability to combine and integrate external technology with its internal 
knowledge basis. A dedicated R&D unit also helps the focal firm establish a more defined 
governance structure for the R&D outsourcing agreement, where authority and responsibility 
over activities and results are clearly assigned and communicated. A collaboration organized 
this way is more likely to be allocated the necessary resources, to be protected from 
organizational interference and to avoid being hostage to political conflicts.  
Finally, a dedicated unit allows a more accurate and timely monitoring of the contractors’ 
behavior, of the respect of milestones, of budgets and of quality targets. This should reduce 
the magnitude of ex-post transaction costs that severely characterize technology transfer 
deals, where the contractor may act opportunistically and reduce the effort and the quality of 
the information supplied. Through a dedicated R&D unit, the focal firm can thus develop the 
capability to monitor the behavior of the contractor during the technology transfer process. 
In the light of the influence that the existence of a dedicated R&D unit has on critical 
capabilities for managing IOI (summarized in the lower part of Table 1), the following 
hypothesis is presented: 
 
H2: The relationship between external technological knowledge acquired through 
R&D outsourcing and product innovation performance is positively moderated by 
the existence of a dedicated R&D unit. 
 
SAMPLE AND MEASURES 
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The article draws on longitudinal data from the Spanish Business Strategy Survey 
(SBSS), an annual survey of a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing firms 
conducted by the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce. Firms in the survey 
represent 20 industrial sectors according to the NACE-Rev.1 classification (National 
Classification of Economic Activities, revised in 1993). Overall, the sample ranges from 1999 
to 2007, including 1,856 firms. Because some firms stopped providing information during the 
sample period for several reasons and because only firms whose data were available for at 
least three consecutive years are included, the article is based on an unbalanced panel of 841 
firms, consisting of 6,161 firm-year observations. Table 2 provides an overview of the entire 
sample. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
Dependent variable 
A firm’s product innovation performance (𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡) is measured using the number of new 
products developed and commercialized by firm i in year t. In the dataset, new products are 
recognized as such only if they are completely different from previous product lines or if they 
have undergone substantial modifications from existing products. Therefore the number of 
new products measures both the firm’s ability to introduce new products in the market and its 
ability to upgrade current ones, which are critical indicators of innovative performance 
(Schoonhoven et al., 1990). Other studies use closely related measures of innovative 
performance such as patents, invention counts and sales growth (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Scherer, 1983). By using this measure, this study departs from Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) who 
use the share of sales due to products new to the market. Firms in this sample introduced, on 
average, 4.25 new products annually. 
 
Independent variable 
The level of external technological knowledge acquired through R&D outsourcing 
( 𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 ) is measured using the average ratio of expenditures for R&D 
outsourcing in Euros over total sales, spent by firm i in the last three years t, t-1 and t-2. This 
operationalization allows controlling for endogeneity concerns. The ratio, instead of the 
absolute expenditures, is used in order to remove size effects. In addition, as for some sample 
firms sales are close to zero, this produces an extremely skewed and leptokurtic distribution 
of the R&D outsourcing ratio. Because the presence of outliers could severely bias the results, 
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this variable is winsorized (e.g., Dixon and Yuen, 1974) with a 1% cut-off for each tail. 
Specifically, the value corresponding to the 99th percentile of its distribution is calculated, and 
assigned to all observations falling beyond it. This approach, which is established in 
innovation research (Nguyen et al., 2010, Baum et al., 2013), reduces the impact of outliers 
and allows the use of a larger number of observations than it would be possible if outliers 
were deleted. The average sample firm invests, on average, 0.204% of its sales in R&D 
outsourcing. Out of 841 firms, 516 had positive R&D outsourcing expenditures. The ratio 
among R&D outsourcing expenditures over sales range for these firms from 0.0001% to 
3.435%, with an average ratio equals to 0.454% (0.118% in median). 
 
Moderating variables 
To investigate the moderation played by the R&D organization, two items that capture 
whether a firm uses the following organizational mechanisms in R&D are considered: (i) 
involvement of external consultants in R&D activities (𝑅&𝐷_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡); (ii) existence 
of a dedicated R&D unit (𝑅&𝐷_𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 )
i. These items, measured every year, are dummy 
variables that take value 1 if the firm i used the specific mechanism in at least one of the last 
three years. The moderating factors over three years are estimated in order to control for the 
endogeneity of these factors. Moreover, it should be considered that the effect on innovation 
performance may not occur for some timeii. During the years covered in the sample, 532 firms 
involved external consultants in R&D, whereas a dedicated R&D unit existed in 487 firms. 
381 firms use both organizational mechanisms, representing a subset of the firms previously 
considered. 
 
Control variables 
Following seminal studies on absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; 
Rothaermel and Alexander, 2009), internal R&D (𝑅&𝐷_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡) is included as a control 
variable. The same procedure is used to estimate the R&D outsourcing variable and internal 
R&D is measured as the average ratio between internal R&D expenditures in Euros and total 
sales estimated over the last three years, and winsorized at 1% level. Existing productsit 
measures in logarithms (logs) the whole range of products commercialized by firm i in year 
t. This control gives the opportunity to partial out differences across firms in terms of the 
weight that product innovation has on the overall firm’s product business. In order to control 
for the cumulated knowledge basis of the firm, the variable Patents stockit is included, which 
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accounts for the size of a firm’s patent portfolio in logs, including both national and 
international patents granted to firm i in year t. A dummy variable Patentsit is also included, 
indicating whether firms have patents or not, because many sample firms do not have any 
patent. To control whether firms faces international competition, a dummy variable Exportit 
is used, indicating if firms export products or not. Furthermore, the relevance of export is 
taken into account by including the share of sales from exports (Export intensityit). A dummy 
variable (Subsidizedit) indicates whether the firm received a public subsidy. The number of 
employees in logs is used to measure firm size (Employeesit). This variable is preferred over 
sales or other measures of size because it is more stable across time and less sensible to 
macroeconomic shocks. Ageit is measured with the number of years since foundation in logs. 
The average sample firm is 28 years old and has 362 employees. Finally, possible 
macroeconomic and business cycle shocks common to all industrial sectors are controled, 
using time dummies for all the years in the sample.  
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation matrix for the 
variables included in the analysis. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
To test the IOI-performance relationship, the following model is estimated as the baseline 
(please see the Appendix for a more detailed description of model specification, and Tables 4 
and 5 for the empirical results): 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑗  𝑗 + 𝜑𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           
                                                                                                                                               [1]
           
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the logarithm of 𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 , the number of new products developed and 
commercialized by firm i in year t,  𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡  measures the level of IOI through 
R&D outsourcing, and 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 are the control variables, as defined in Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.4., 𝑍𝑡 
contains period fixed effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is an error term.  𝛽1  is expected to be positive and 
significant and 𝛽2 to be negative and significant, indicating an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between IOI through R&D outsourcing and product innovation performance. The baseline 
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model (Equation 1) is modified as follows. First, a model is derived that only includes the 
direct effect of the two R&D organizational mechanisms on product innovation performance: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑗  𝑗 +
𝜑𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                  [2] 
 
where 𝑀𝑖𝑡  indicates the proxies for the use of R&D organizational mechanisms 
(𝑅&𝐷_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡  and  𝑅&𝐷_𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 ), as described in Section 3.3. More in detail, two 
different models are estimated in which the direct effect of each R&D organizational 
mechanism under analysis is inserted separately (see Model A1 and Model B1 in Tables 4 
and 5). The direct effect engendered by each moderating variable is described by the 
coefficient 𝛽3: if positive and significant, it would indicate an increase of product innovation 
performance related to the use of the specific mechanism. 
To test the hypotheses on the moderation caused by the R&D organizational mechanisms 
(H1 and H2), two different operationalizations found in prior innovation research are used. 
The first, named Moderation Effect 1, refers to the effect that the moderating variable has on 
the elasticity of the inverted U-shaped IOI-performance curve. According to this 
operationalization and the hypotheses, the adoption of a specific organizational mechanism 
(involvement of external consultants or existence of a dedicated R&D unit) positively 
moderates the inverted U-shaped IOI-performance relationship because the marginal benefits 
of increasing the level of R&D outsourcing on product innovation performance are stronger 
when the firm adopts the specific organizational mechanism. This operationalization of 
moderation has been used by Rothaermel and Alexander (2009) who show that the slope 
(elasticity) of the inverted U-shaped relationship between technology sourcing mix and firm 
financial performance becomes steeper when the firm possesses higher levels of absorptive 
capacity.  
The second operationalization, named Moderation Effect 2, refers to the effect that the 
moderating variable has on the horizontal positioning of the tipping point of the inverted U-
shaped IOI-performance curve. According to this operationalization and the hypotheses, the 
IOI-performance relationship is positively moderated by the adoption of a specific 
organizational mechanism (involvement of external consultants or existence of a dedicated 
R&D unit) in such a way that the tipping point after which increasing R&D outsourcing has 
negative effects on product innovation performance is reached at higher levels of R&D 
18 
 
outsourcing when the firm adopts the specific organizational mechanism. This 
operationalization of moderation has been used by Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) who find that 
the tipping point of the IOI-performance curve moves towards higher levels of R&D 
outsourcing as the firm’s internal R&D and breadth of R&D collaborations increase. Figures 
1a and 1b illustrate the two distinct moderating effects and show that four types of curves can 
result from the moderation played by each organizational mechanism on the baseline, 
depending on the sign of each moderation effect (positive or negative). In the hypotheses H1 
and H2, both a positive Moderation Effect 1 and a positive Moderation Effect 2 are 
hypothesized to exist. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
The distinction between Moderation Effect 1 and Moderation Effect 2 is relevant, because 
the two effects have different implications from a managerial point of view. A positive 
Moderation Effect 1 signals that an increase in the level of R&D outsourcing leads to a 
stronger improvement of product innovation performance when the firm uses a specific 
organizational mechanism. Instead, a positive Moderation Effect 2 indicates that, by using a 
specific organizational mechanism, the firm starts experiencing the negative effects of IOI on 
product innovation performance at higher levels of R&D outsourcing. These two 
operationalizations of moderation have not been tested jointly in innovation research so far, 
and thus represent a further contribution of this article. 
To assess moderation, the following model is estimated, in which the interaction terms 
of the moderating variables with both the linear and the squared terms of 
𝑅&𝐷_𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 are included: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑗  𝑗 + 𝜑𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              [3] 
 
Two different models are estimated in which the effect of 𝑅&𝐷_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 
and  𝑅&𝐷_𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 , and their interactions with the linear and the squared terms of 
𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡, are inserted separately (see Model A2 and Model B2 in Tables 4 and 
5). Moderation Effect 1 exists if the elasticity of the IOI-performance relationship is modified 
by the presence of the specific moderating factor 𝑀𝑖𝑡. Thus, both the linear and the squared 
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terms of 𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 must be evaluated in presence of the moderating factor 𝑀𝑖𝑡. 
Because the sign and the significance of the coefficients 𝛽4 and 𝛽5 only indicate how and 
whether each moderating variable influences the IOI-performance relationship, a test is 
conducted on a combination of parameters in Equation [3] that allow estimation of both the 
linear and the squared terms of R&D outsourcing in the presence of the moderating factor 
𝑀𝑖𝑡, as follows: 
 
{
𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽4 
𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽2 + 𝛽5
    [4] 
 
In order to evaluate Moderation Effect 2 the level of R&D outsourcing at which the curve 
reaches its maximum is estimated as follows: 
 
 −(𝛽1 + 𝛽4)/2(𝛽2 + 𝛽5)        [5] 
 
RESULTS 
The results of the estimation models predicting product innovation performance are 
shown in Table 4, which reports the following models: the baseline model, which includes all 
the control variables as well as the independent variable 𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡; Model A1, 
which considers only the direct effect of 𝑅&𝐷_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡; Model A2, which includes 
also its moderating effect to test H1; Model B1, which considers only the direct effect of 
𝑅&𝐷_𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡; Model B2, which includes also its moderating effect to test H2. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
Considering the baseline model, an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between 
external technological knowledge acquired through R&D outsourcing and product innovation 
performance. The linear term of 𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡, 𝛽1, is positive and significant, while 
the squared coefficient, 𝛽2, is negative and significant. This result holds in all models (except 
for Model A2, where the coefficients have the predicted sign but lose significance). In the 
baseline model the tipping point from which additional R&D outsourcing has a negative effect 
on product innovation performance is estimated, by performing the following test: −
𝛽1
2𝛽2
. The 
test indicates that the tipping pont is reached at a level of R&D outsourcing equal to 2.061% 
20 
 
of firm sales. The positive and significant 𝛽3 coefficients in Models A1 and A2 indicate that 
firms that involve external consultants in R&D activities achieve higher product innovation 
performance. The same coefficients in Models B1 and B2 show the same results for firms that 
establish a dedicated R&D unit. 
Hypothesis H1 predicts that the involvement of external consultants in R&D activities 
positively moderates the IOI-performance relationship. Model A2 includes both the linear and 
squared interaction terms between 𝑅&𝐷_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡  and R&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐ingit , whose 
coefficients are found significant, indicating that the involvement of external consultants 
modifies the IOI-performance curve. Specifically, the linear interaction term is positive and 
significant and the squared term of interaction is negative and significant. To assess the shape 
of the moderated curve, the coefficients of the linear and squared terms of R&D outsourcing 
when external consultants are involved are estimated, according to Equation [4]. These 
coefficients, reported in Table 5 (Model A2, lower part “With R&D organizational 
mechanisms”), are found to be significant, thus suggesting that the IOI-performance 
relationship is still U-shaped in the presence of external consultants and that the involvement 
of external consultants has a positive Moderation Effect 1, i.e., it increases the elasticity of 
the IOI-performance curve by strengthening the marginal effects of increasing the level of 
R&D outsourcing on product innovation performance. To correctly evaluate Moderation 
Effect 2, the results of Equation [5] are considered, where the tipping point of this moderated 
curve is estimated (Model A2). It is found that the tipping point for firms that involve external 
consultants is reached at a lower level of R&D outsourcing equal to 1.934% of firm's sales, 
while the one estimated in the baseline model is equal to 2.061% of firm sales. This suggests 
a negative Moderation Effect 2. Therefore, hypothesis H1 is supported if the moderation of 
the involvement of external consultants is operationalized as Moderation Effect 1, while the 
same hypothesis is rejected if the moderation is operationalized as Moderation Effect 2. 
Hypothesis H2 predicts that the existence of a dedicated R&D unit positively moderates 
the IOI-performance relationship. Model B2 includes both the linear and squared interaction 
terms between 𝑅&𝐷_𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 and R&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐ingit. The results in this model indicate that 
the existence of a dedicated R&D unit modifies the IOI-performance curve. This is true 
because, even though the squared term of interaction is not significant, the linear term of 
interaction is found negative and significant. The shape of the moderated curve can be 
assessed by estimating Equation [4]. As reported in Table 5 (Model B2, lower part “With 
R&D organizational mechanisms”), the coefficients of the linear and squared terms of R&D 
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outsourcing when a dedicated R&D unit exists, are significant and with the expected signs, 
suggesting that the IOI-performance relationship has still an inverted U-shape in the presence 
of a dedicated R&D unit. The lower value (in absolute terms) of the coefficients indicates that 
the existence of a dedicated R&D unit has a negative Moderation Effect 1, i.e., it reduces the 
elasticity of the IOI-performance curve by attenuating the marginal effects of increasing the 
level of R&D outsourcing on product innovation performance. To correctly evaluate 
Moderation Effect 2, the results of Equation [5] to estimate the tipping point of this moderated 
curve are examined (Model B2). It is found that the tipping point for firms with a dedicated 
R&D unit is reached at a higher level of R&D outsourcing equal to 2.158% of firm's sales, 
compared to the tipping point in the baseline model equal to 2.061% of firm sales. This result 
suggests a positive Moderation Effect 2. Therefore, hypothesis H2 is supported if the 
moderation of the existence of a dedicated R&D unit is operationalized as Moderation Effect 
2, while the same hypothesis is rejected if the moderation is operationalized as Moderating 
Effect 1. 
 
[Table 5] 
 
Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the shapes and the tipping points of the IOI-performance 
curve estimated in the baseline model and of the curves moderated, respectively, by the 
involvement of external consultants and by the existence of a dedicated R&D unit (only the 
coefficients for R&D outsourcing are plotted; the other coefficients are set at the value of 
zero). 
 
[Figure 2] 
Finally, as a complement to the theoretical framework proposed in Section 2, a test  is 
conducted for the existence of synergistic effects from the simultaneous use of external 
consultants and of a dedicated R&D unit. The example of leading firms with long experience 
in open innovation, such as Procter & Gamble (Huston and Sakkab, 2006), Fiat (Di Minin et 
al., 2013) and DSM (Kirschbaum, 2005), point to the existence of benefits from combining 
informal and formalized organizational mechanisms. Thus, this study’s empirical models 
contiain a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm i both involves external consultants 
in R&D (𝑅&𝐷_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡) and establishes a dedicated unit for R&D (𝑅&𝐷_𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡), in at 
least one of the last three years. The estimates of the models A3 and B3, built in the same 
fashion as for each single moderating variable, are reported in the last columns of Tables 4 
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and 5. The linear and the squared terms of interaction are both not significant. These results 
suggest that the combined presence of external consultants and a dedicated R&D unit does 
not significantly influence the effects of R&D outsourcing on product innovation 
performance, leaving the shape and the tipping point of the curve unaltered. The coefficients 
of the linear and squared terms of R&D outsourcing when both external consultants and a 
dedicated R&D unit exist, estimated by Equation [4] and reported in Table 5 (Model B3, 
lower part “With R&D organizational mechanisms”), are significant, indicating that the IOI-
performance curve is still U-shaped. Overall, the results of the empirical analysis suggest that 
by combining the use of external consultants with the presence of a dedicated R&D unit, their 
moderation effects on the IOI-performance relationship may cancel out. 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
IOI is a major component of the innovation approach of most innovative firms. To deepen 
the understanding of this important phenomenon, this article investigates the influence of two 
R&D organizational mechanisms on the relationship between external technological 
knowledge acquired through R&D outsourcing and product innovation performance. Besides 
showing that this relationship has an inverted U-shape, the empirical study identifies multiple 
moderating effects stemming from the involvement of external consultants in R&D activities 
and from the existence of a dedicated R&D unit. The results concerning Moderation Effect 1 
indicate that the involvement of external consultants strengthens the marginal benefits of 
R&D outsourcing on product innovation performance (in the ascending part of the curve), 
whereas the existence of a dedicated R&D unit attenuates these benefits. The results 
concerning Moderation Effect 2 show that the involvement of external consultants reduces 
the optimal level of R&D outsourcing to which the highest product innovation performance 
corresponds, whereas the existence of a dedicated unit increases the optimal level (see Table 
6).  Below is an interpretation of these findings and, in particular, of the contrasting results 
from the two different operationalizations of the moderation.  
 
[Table 6] 
 
The involvement of external consultants in R&D activities can be interpreted as an 
organizational mechanism that makes the firm more sensitive to the impact of changes in the 
level of R&D outsourcing on product innovation performance. This mechanism increases the 
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elasticity of the inverted U-shaped curve while reducing the value of R&D outsourcing that 
corresponds to the highest number of new products developed and commercialized. The 
involvement of external consultants may increase the proficiency of the focal firm in scouting 
and identifying potentially valuable contractors. By leveraging the thick extended social 
networks of the external consultants, firms can access the most suitable partners whose R&D 
services contribute to higher product innovation performance. The personal ties and 
credibility afforded by external consultants contribute to more collaborative and trust-based 
outsourcing agreements where the different languages and knowledge domains existing 
within and across the counterparts are harmonized. In this environment, the knowlege transfer 
process is augmented, meaning that by involving external consultants the firm can make the 
most out of the acquired technological knowledge and achieve the highest innovation 
performance at lower levels of R&D outsourcing. 
The establishment of a dedicated R&D unit can be interpreted instead as an organizational 
mechanism that reduces the sensitivity of the firm’s innovation performance to changes in the 
level of R&D outsourcing. This mechanism attenuates the marginal benefits from R&D 
outsourcing while increasing the level of R&D outsourcing after which its effects on product 
innovation become negative. This latter effect may occur because, by establishing a dedicated 
R&D unit, the firm may better address the typical drawbacks of extensive IOI such as lower 
knowledge appropriability and loss of control over core competencies. The existence of a 
dedicated R&D unit supports the creation of formalized routines that govern the process of 
acquiring technological knowledge from external sources. While this level of formalization 
may introduce some rigidity and may result in a lower marginal contribution to innovation 
performance of each R&D outsourcing agreement, the existence of a dedicated R&D unit 
allows firms to do more inbound open innovation without suffering from its negative effects, 
e.g., as a result of more effective monitoring of the partner behavior and reduced knowledge 
spillovers. 
The different moderating role played by the two organizational mechanisms might 
suggest that they have contrasting effects on the critical capabilities for managing IOI and 
also explain why their combined use has no significant effect on the IOI–performance 
relationship. This result is not in line with existing anecdotal evidence that highlights the 
advantages of an assorted approach to the organization of open innovation processes (Di 
Minin et al., 2013; Kirschbaum, 2005). Procter & Gamble’s Connect & Develop system, for 
instance, is successfully supported by both informal decentralized mechanisms, like the 
technology entrepreneurs network, and centralized formalized ones, like the External 
24 
 
Business Development Group (Huston and Sakkab, 2006). While these synergistic effects 
may occur only at companies at the forefront of open innovation practice, the diverse firms 
investigated in this large scale empirical study may experience inefficiencies due to the 
increased complexity and investments required by combining the two R&D organizational 
mechanisms.  
 
Implications for research 
This article has implications for research on open innovation, R&D management, 
absorptive capacity and related capabilities. Regarding open innovation, this study offers a 
thorough analysis and critical re-examination of IOI and of its impact on firm’s performance, 
thus contributing to the current debate on this topic (Laursen and Salter, 2006; West and 
Bogers, 2013). The findings for R&D outsourcing, which among the different forms for IOI 
has received less attention among scholars, are consistent with those reported in Deeds and 
Hill (1996) and Rothaermel and Deeds (2006), that show an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between IOI and innovation performance. As these studies focus on strategic alliances in the 
context of entrepreneurial biotech firms, it appears that the abovementioned curvilinear 
relationship is generalizable, regardless of the contractual form used to acquire external 
technological knowledge and of the characteristics of the innovative firm. Moreover, this 
study supports the need to adopt a contingency perspective when studying the phenomenon 
of IOI. The proficiency with which a firm acquires and transforms external technological 
knowledge depends on a set of organizational mechanisms. The focus on R&D organization 
contributes to research on open innovation, where few articles have systematically 
investigated which organizational levers affect the performance of open innovation processes 
and how (Bianchi et al., 2011).  
The article also contributes to research on the organisation of R&D activities (Chiesa, 
2001). Research on the critical success factors for R&D and new product development 
highlights the importance of formalizing R&D activities and of creating social and personal 
ties to establish rich communication networks. This article indicates that these two R&D 
organizational mechanisms, which have been traditionally studied in a context of closed 
innovation, continue playing a key role under the more recent, and arguably more complex, 
open innovation paradigm. This role varies depending on the specific nature of the 
organizational mechanism, as discussed in this article. 
Finally, this article extends prior capabilities research, in particular the stream focusing 
on absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity has been typically conceptualized and measured 
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with aggregate variables like internal R&D expenditures or patent stocks (Rothaermel and 
Alexandre, 2009). The rationale was that a stock of prior internal technological knowledge 
increases the proficiency with which firms absorb and exploit external knowledge. The 
analysis shows that this focus on resources as antecedents of absorptive capacity is not 
sufficient. Instead, absorptive capacity strongly depends on the adoption of appropriate R&D 
organizational mechanisms that influence the capabilities needed to transform external 
technological knowledge into new products (Zahra and George, 2002). This article 
conceptually identifies these capabilities and suggests that they may be differently influenced 
by distinct organizational mechanisms. The results for formalized versus informal 
mechanisms inform the growing body of capability-based studies in several managerial 
settings, e.g., new product development and alliance management, about the need to account 
for the heterogeneity of R&D organization and for its differential role in capability 
development. 
 
Implications for managers 
This study provides important managerial implications. First, it highlights the positive 
impact that IOI has on a firm’s product innovation performance. Firms that ground their 
competitive advantage on product innovation can acquire external technological knowledge 
to increase the number of new products that they develop and commercialize. Nevertheless, 
the study advises managers against the risk of over-acquiring external technological 
knowledge. The results show that an optimal level of expenditures for R&D outsourcing 
exists. After this point, acquiring technology knowledge from external sources has detrimental 
effects on innovation performance. In this sample of Spanish manufacturing firms, the optimal 
ratio of R&D outsourcing expenditures to sales is approximately 2%. Of course, this level 
varies depending on a large number of influencing variables. 
This study also provides managers with suggestions as to how they can improve the 
benefits of IOI on innovation performance. The involvement of external consultants and the 
establishment of a dedicated R&D unit can serve this purpose, although they have different 
effects. The involvement of external consultants increases the sensitivity of the firm’s 
innovation performance to changes to the level of R&D outsourcing. It thus allows achieving 
larger innovation outputs even with small increases of R&D outsourcing. However, this 
mechanism reduces the level of R&D outsourcing after which its negative consequences 
become manifest. Therefore, involving external consultants seems to be more appropriate for 
those firms that have relatively low levels of R&D outsourcing expenditures and want to 
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increase their product innovation performance on an ad hoc basis, by increasing the level of 
IOI. 
On the other hand, the existence of a dedicated R&D unit attenuates the sensitivity of 
of the firm’s innovation performance to changes to the level of R&D outsourcing. It reduces 
the increase of product innovation performance resulting from raising the expenditures for 
R&D outsourcing but it allows reaching high levels of R&D outsourcing before its negative 
consequences occur. Therefore, establishing a dedicated R&D unit seems to be more 
appropriate for those firms that have significant expenditures for R&D outsourcing and need 
to manage and orchestrate a constant and extensive flow of technological knowledge coming 
from external sources. 
 
Limitations and future research 
This study has several limitations, which suggest future research efforts. First, it should 
be noted that the methodology only accounts for the quantitative aspect of product innovation, 
and not for its quality. The dependent variable could be improved by considering the impact 
that IOI has on the profitability of product innovation (e.g, by measuring the return on 
investment of a firm’s new product development projects). This will likely capture other 
benefits associated with IOI, such as cost reduction and flexibility in internal R&D. 
Second, this work may be at risk of aggregation bias as no distinction is made between 
R&D outsourcing agreements at different stages of the innovation value chain and with 
different partners. Also, the study focuses on outcomes at the firm level of analysis. A more 
fine-grained analysis at the individual project level may offer a deeper understanding of the 
moderating role played by the organization of R&D. Being binary variables, the measures for 
R&D organizational mechanisms are rather aggregate and do not allow capturing the nuances 
in the design and use of the same mechanisms. Also the data do not explicitly capture whether 
and how these mechanisms are used in the context of IOI, which is thus a strong, although 
reasonable, assumption. 
Future research is encouraged to study the micro-dynamics through which R&D 
organizational mechanisms influence the firm’s capabilities for managing IOI, not only at the 
firm level of analysis but also at the project and individual levels. Indeed, these capabilities 
appear to build on the knowledge and skills of individuals, on their interaction and on the 
tasks executed to transfer knowledge in well-defined projects. Going beyond the findings of 
this study, future research should adopt a contingency perspective to scrutinize under what 
contextual factors managers should apply each of the two organizational mechanisms. 
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Future studies should also broaden the scope of the analysis, including service sectors, 
other contractual forms for acquiring external technological knowledge, as well as other 
managerial and organizational levers that can be used to support IOI (e.g., types of incentives 
given to R&D employees). In so doing, the set of capabilities discussed in this article in 
relation to R&D outsourcing can be used as a starting point and extended to properly account 
for the peculiar challenges entailed by different IOI forms. 
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APPENDIX 
Because the dependent variable 𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡  is a count outcome taking non-negative integers, a 
regression approach for Poisson data is suitable. However, the classical Poisson regression is 
sensitive to distributional assumptions (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). Considering that the 
data show some overdispersion, a negative binomial model is used (Greene, 1999) estimated 
trough a fixed effects model. The model specification is the following: 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒
𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽          [A.1] 
 
where 𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the number of new products developed and commercialized by firm i in year t 
and 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′  is the matrix of regressors. The log-linear model of Equation [A.1] can be written as 
follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑗  𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        [A.2] 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of 𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡, and 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 are the regressors included in the model. 
All the models used in the study (Model A and Model B) are derived from Equation A.2 by 
introducing the independent variables, the moderating factors and the control variables 
described in Section 3. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: A summary of the critical capabilities for managing IOI that are influenced by each R&D organizational mechanism. 
 Capabilities for managing IOI 
Capabilities that are influenced by the involvement 
of external consultants in R&D activities 
Scouting and identifying potentially valuable providers of R&D outsourcing services 
Creating a trustworthy relationship with the external contractor 
Effectively negotiating the terms of the R&D outsourcing agreement 
Amplifying the transfer of knowledge during the collaboration with the external contractor, including both tacit and 
codified aspects 
Capabilities that are influenced by the 
establishment of a dedicated R&D unit  
Leverage learning effects about how external technology is acquired through R&D outsourcing and transformed 
Establishing formalized routines for the acquisition of external technological knowledge 
Understanding and anticipating the technological needs of the focal firm 
Combining and integrating external technological knowledge with the internal knowledge basis of the focal firm 
Establishing defined governance structures for R&D outsourcing agreements 
Monitoring the behavior of the contractor during the technology transfer process 
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Table 2: Sample overview 
Industry Number of firms % 
Number of firms 
with 3 
consecutive 
years of 
observation 
Number of firms 
with 4 
consecutive 
years of 
observation 
Number of firms 
with 5 
consecutive 
years of 
observation 
Number of firms 
with more than 5 
consecutive 
years of 
observation 
Average number 
of new products 
Average R&D 
outsourcing 
expenditures as 
% of sales 
Meat processing  49 2,64 15 13 12 10 2,81 0,06 
Food and tobacco  177 9,54 80 64 62 47 2,12 0,09 
Beverages 41 2,21 23 17 17 9 1,41 0,07 
Textile 175 9,43 68 60 56 45 13,75 0,12 
Leather and shoes 58 3,13 25 20 19 15 9,30 0,12 
Wood and timber 65 3,50 15 13 11 8 0,53 0,16 
Paper and printing products 59 3,18 21 17 16 12 2,80 0,03 
Editing and graphical arts 98 5,28 25 22 21 16 7,32 0,04 
Chemical products 131 7,06 88 71 69 52 3,20 0,45 
Rubber and plastic products 93 5,01 52 43 43 34 2,50 0,14 
Non-metallic mineral products  151 8,14 56 41 39 33 2,98 0,12 
Metallurgy  57 3,07 28 25 25 20 1,78 0,10 
Metal products 202 10,88 57 49 48 38 3,10 0,23 
Machines and mechanical equipment  117 6,30 77 57 55 47 2,61 0,25 
Office and data processing machines  26 1,40 14 8 7 5 2,88 0,57 
Electric and electronic machinery  99 5,33 60 43 41 31 5,65 0,29 
Motor vehicles  91 4,90 51 47 46 35 3,31 0,34 
Other transport equipment 40 2,16 26 21 20 18 1,59 0,64 
Furniture  90 4,85 45 41 40 33 4,10 0,04 
Other manufacturing products 37 1,99 15 13 12 9 7,93 0,01 
Total 1,856 100 841 685 659 517 4.25 0.20 
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Table 3: Means, standard deviations and correlations 
  Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 4,254 19,336 1             
2 𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 0,205 0,587 0,015 1            
3 𝑅&𝐷_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 0,445 0,497 0,050*** 0,143*** 1           
4 𝑅&𝐷_𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 0,440 0,496 0,037*** 0,203*** 0,342*** 1          
5 𝑅&𝐷_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 0,429 0,958 0,056*** 0,479*** 0,146*** 0,317*** 1         
6 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 0,754 0,160 -0,005 0,011 0,024* 0,073*** 0,025* 1        
7 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 0,109 0,312 0,001 0,180*** 0,139*** 0,217*** 0,207*** 0,039*** 1       
8 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡 0,444 0,958 0,005 0,257*** 0,206*** 0,259*** 0,304*** 0,018 0,634*** 1      
9 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 0,801 0,399 0,072*** 0,085*** 0,152*** 0,279*** 0,142*** 0,048*** 0,125*** 0,164*** 1     
10 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 0,178 0,245 0,017 0,177*** 0,108*** 0,207*** 0,253*** 0,010 0,057*** 0,129*** 0,361*** 1    
11 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 0,184 0,387 0,026** 0,278*** 0,237*** 0,386*** 0,355*** 0,040*** 0,225*** 0,234*** 0,172*** 0,165*** 1   
12 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 4,788 1,487 0,032** 0,157*** 0,292*** 0,474*** 0,119*** 0,098*** 0,166*** 0,230*** 0,407*** 0,239*** 0,316*** 1  
13 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 3,075 0,846 0,024* 0,073*** 0,057*** 0,150*** 0,093*** 0,009 0,044*** 0,097*** 0,092*** 0,118*** 0,101*** 0,219*** 1 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4: Negative binomial estimation model predicting Product innovation performance 
Variable description Coeff. Baseline Model_A1 Model_A2 Model_B1 Model_B2 Model_A3 Model_B3 
Independent Variables                
𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡  𝛽1 0.5829 *** 0.5283 *** 0.2671  0.4617 *** 0.8493 *** 0.4505 *** 0.5129 *** 
  (0,123)  (0,124)  (0,199)  (0,124)  (0,24)  (-0,125)  (0,177)  
 𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
2
 𝛽2 -0.1414 *** -0.1285 *** -0.0372 
 -0.103 *** -0.1858 ** -0.1042 *** -0.1104 * 
   (0,038)  (0,038)  (0,065)  (0,038)  (0,079)  (0,038)  (0,058)  
                 
Moderating Variables                
𝑅&𝐷_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝛽3   0.2414 *** 0.2082 ***         
     (0,054)  (0,059)          
𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝛽4     0.3869 *         
       (0,229)          
𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝛽5     -0.1319 *         
       (0,076)          
𝑅&𝐷_𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽3       0.727 *** 0.791 ***     
         (0,066)  (-0,071)      
𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷_𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽4         -0.5141 *     
           (0,268)      
𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷_𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽5         0.1081      
          (0,088)      
𝑅&𝐷_𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝛽3           0.5387 *** 0.5667 *** 
             (0,058)  (0,065)  
𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷_𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝛽4             -0.1288  
               (0,22)  
𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷_𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝛽5             0.0161  
               (0,072)  
Control Variables                
 𝑅&𝐷_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 
 0.1576 *** 0.1542 *** 0.1559 *** 0.1255 *** 0.1289 *** 0.1492 *** 0.1505 *** 
  (0,03)  (0,03)  (0,03)  (0,03)  (0,03)  (0,03)  (0,03)  
𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡  
 0.1647  0.1573  0.1492  0.1845  0.1735  0.1313  0.126  
   (0,147)  (0,148)  (0,148)  (0,147)  (0,147)  (0,148)  (0,148)  
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡  
 0.4151 *** 0.417 *** 0.4205 *** 0.3768 *** 0.3694 *** 0.411 *** 0.4065 *** 
  (0,071)  (0,071)  (0,071)  (0,07)  (0,07)  (0,071)  (0,071)  
 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡 
 0.0167  -0.0012  -0.0026  0.0066  0.0127  -0.0242  -0.0199  
  (0,036)  (0,037)  (0,037)  (0,036)  (0,036)  (0,037)  (0,037)  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡  
 0.4159 *** 0.4052 *** 0.4032 *** 0.3913 *** 0.3849 *** 0.3767 *** 0.3758 *** 
  (0,092)  (0,093)  (0,093)  (0,093)  (0,093)  (0,093)  (0,093)  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  
 0.3937 *** 0.3821 *** 0.3748 *** 0.3507 *** 0.3591 *** 0.3578 *** 0.3577 *** 
  (0,131)  (0,131)  (0,132)  (0,131)  (0,131)  (0,131)  (0,131)  
 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 
 0.2427 *** 0.224 *** 0.2232 *** 0.1868 *** 0.1913 *** 0.204 *** 0.209 *** 
  (0,059)  (0,059)  (0,059)  (0,059)  (0,059)  (0,059)  (0,059)  
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  
 0.1091 *** 0.0929 *** 0.097 *** 0.0054  0.0006  0.0659 ** 0.0615 ** 
  (0,029)  (0,029)  (0,029)  (0,03)  (0,03)  (0,029)  (0,029)  
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 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 -0.162 *** -0.1543 *** -0.1556 *** -0.1734 *** -0.1758 *** -0.154 *** -0.1549 *** 
   (0,044)  (0,044)  (0,044)  (0,045)  (0,045)  (0,045)  (0,045)  
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Costant  -2.8723 *** -2.852 *** -2.8449 *** -2.4702 *** -2.4556 *** -2.6585 *** -2.6419 *** 
   (0,316)  (0,316)  (0,316)  (0,322)  (0,323)  (0,319)  (0,319)  
                 
N. Observations  6161  6161  6161  6161  6161  6161  6161  
N. Firms  841  841  841  841  841  841  841  
Chi2  658.8946  678.7546  682.7442  762.5623  764.817  737.0165  738.3285  
p-value  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
Log likelihood  -7230  -7220  -7220  -7170  -7160  -7190  -7180  
***, **, and * represent statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5: Moderating Effects 
Variable description Coeff. Baseline Model_A1 Model_A2 Model_B1 Model_B2 Model_A3 Model_B3 
No R&D organizational mechanisms                
𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡  𝛽1 0.5829 *** 0.5283 *** 0.2671  0.4617 *** 0.8493 *** 0.4505 *** 0.5129 *** 
  (0,123)  (0,124)  (0,199)  (0,124)  (0,24)  (-0,125)  (0,177)  
 𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
2
 𝛽2 -0.1414 *** -0.1285 *** -0.0372 
 -0.103 *** -0.1858 ** -0.1042 *** -0.1104 * 
   (0,038)  (0,038)  (0,065)  (0,038)  (0,079)  (0,038)  (0,058)  
                 
With R&D organizational mechanisms                
𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡  𝛽1 +  𝛽4     0.6539 ***   0.3352 **   0.3841 ** 
      (0,1444)    (0,1387)    (0,1571)  
 𝑅&𝐷_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
2
 𝛽2 +  𝛽5     -0.169 ***   -0.0776 *   -0.0943 ** 
       (0,0444)    (0,0426)    (0,0478)  
                 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6: Overview of the empirical results for the moderation effects 
R&D organizational 
mechanisms  
Moderation Effect 1 
Impact on the elasticity of the 
inverted U-shaped IOI-performance 
curve 
Moderation Effect 2 
Impact on the tipping point of the 
inverted U-shaped IOI-performance 
curve 
Involvement of 
external consultants in 
R&D activities 
+ - 
Establishment of a 
dedicated R&D unit - + 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Moderation Effect 1 and 2. 
a) 
 
b) 
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Figure 2: Moderating Effects by the R&D organizational mechanisms. 
a)                                                                                                                                                 b) 
  
 
 
 
i The questionnaire was administered in Spanish and the questions used to measure these variables are: Indique si en el año “t” la empresa dispuso de los siguentes mecanismos 
o realizó las siguentes acciones: (i) Utilizó asesores o expertos para informarse sobre tecnologias; (ii) Mantuvo una dirección o comité de Tecnología o I + D. 
ii As robustness check, a different operationalization of the use of each R&D organizational mechanisms was applied. The moderating dummy variables are defined as taking 
value 1 if firm i uses the R&D organizational mechanism in each of the last three years. These estimates, which are very similar to those reported in the results section, are not 
included in the manuscript for the sake of concision, but are available from the authors upon request. 
                                                          
